

The Evolution of Data Breaches

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Retail Data Security – Recent Victims




Largest Cyber Risks to Your Organization

1. Credit card breaches
2. Disgruntled IT, “bad leaver”
3. Personal records breach
4. Vendor network connections (and contracts)
5. Everything else
6. Bring your own device or “BYOD” (yes, very low on this list)
7. Lost/stolen machines



Magnetic Stripe Data


- ▶ Magnetic stripe data is the information on the BACK of a credit card
- ▶ Contains account number, name, expiration and many “hidden” digits needed to process a transaction



Track2 Captured: 82950732019230449=111020101783100038

Magnetic Stripe Data

- ▶ No other personal data (SSNs, street address, etc.)
- ▶ Track data is the “holy grail” for data thieves



Track2 Captured: 82950732019230449=111020101783100038

Flow of Most Restaurants, Stores and Hotels



Card Writers on eBay



Mouse over image to zoom

Original MSR605 Magnetic Credit Card Reader Writer Magstrip Mag Strip MSR206 USB

Item condition: **New**

Quantity:

More than 10 available / 12 sold

Price: **US \$125.00**

[Buy It Now](#)

[Add to cart](#)

Best Offer:

7 watching

[Make Offer](#)

[Add to watch list](#)

[Add to collection](#)

Free shipping

30-day returns

New condition

Shipping: **FREE** Standard Shipping | [See details](#)

Item location: Rosemead, California, United States

Ships to: United States, Canada, Europe, Australia, Mexico | [See exclusions](#)

Delivery: Estimated between **Tue. Jun. 30** and **Tue. Jul. 7**
Use [Expedited Shipping](#) to get it by Jul. 2

Payments: [PayPal](#) [VISA](#) [MasterCard](#) [Discover](#)

Credit Cards processed by PayPal

PayPal CREDIT

Spend \$99+ and get 6 months to pay | [Apply Now](#) | [See Terms](#)

[Add to watch list](#)

Seller information

ilangstore (476 ★)

99.2% Positive feedback

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The Cost of a Breach

- ▶ The investigation
- ▶ Fines by the card brands
- ▶ Reissuance costs and fraud from issuing banks
- ▶ Regulatory penalties
- ▶ Loss of IT time
- ▶ Increased IT/audit budgets



Your Incident Response Team

- ▶ General counsel
- ▶ Information technology
 - Emotionally committed
 - Already overworked
- ▶ Outside counsel
- ▶ Public relations
- ▶ Federal law enforcement
- ▶ Executive leadership

How do YOU
define the word
“breach”?



The Steps

- ▶ Who found the breach?
 - Customers?
 - Law enforcement?
 - Bank?
- ▶ Containment
 - Catch the bad guy, or
 - Stop the bleeding
- ▶ Acquisition
- ▶ Analysis
- ▶ Customer notification
- ▶ Regulatory notification
- ▶ Rebuilding
 - Brand
 - Technology



Cyber Attack – Factors Driving Response

- ▶ Your investigation
 - Catch the “bad guy” versus stop the attack, versus prevent future attacks
- ▶ State laws
 - 47 states prescribe timing (30–45 days), format and content of required consumer notification
- ▶ State Attorneys General
 - 19 states require separate notices to AG
 - Focus on consumer protection
 - Varying interpretations




Hackers are Lazy



(and have been for years)

PCAnywhere Breaches (2006–2008)

- ▶ Attackers used to target major metro area
- ▶ Looking for back of house (BOH), POS, Micros...
- ▶ One laptop could scan 1 million IPs in four hours
- ▶ ~1,200 would become potential victims
- ▶ > 50 would be easy targets
- ▶ Many merchants were **STORING** track data
 - TJX > 90 million records



Perfect Keylogger – \$29



Memory Dumpers – Free



DIABLOHORN
Attempting to understand security

stay updated via rss

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RECENT POSTS

- Parsing the hiberfil.sys, searching for slack space

➔ **Process Memory Dumper**

Posted: August 24, 2009 in **kd-team archive, tools**
Tags: C, **dumper, memory, process**

Another old tool :)

DOWNLOAD

About these ads


RAM Dumping Malware Targeting Tokenization

- ▶ Target: Major sporting arena
- ▶ Magnitude: This single location housed 80,000 people twice a week
- ▶ Method of entry: Remote access; no anti-virus

```
8496data: 5155          4=10011010001009160000 lea
8552Found track data at UTG2.exe with PID 1544!
8596data: B435          23~SHI /KATHERINE G^1506:
8682data: 4356          3=15061010000000000977 lea
8738data: 4003          6=140410111019730 length:
8789data: 4744          4=15111010000000000039 lea
8845data: 3767          =150910111117253200000 lea
8901data: 4238          6=15041010385132800000 lea
<
-physical0-lab\p\WINNT\SYSTEM32\memdump
```

RAM Dumping Malware Targeting Tokenization

- ▶ Details: The attacker's malware specifically looked for programs named after popular tokenization applications
- ▶ Date range: 14 months



```
8496data: 5155          4=10011010001009160000 lea
8552Found track data at UTG2.exe with PID 1544!
8596data: B435          23~SHI /KATHERINE G^1506:
8682data: 4356          3=15061010000000000977 lea
8738data: 4003          6=140410111019730 length:
8789data: 4744          4=15111010000000000039 lea
8845data: 3767          =150910111117253200000 lea
8901data: 4238          6=15041010385132800000 lea
<
-physical0-lab\D\WINNT\SYSTEM32\memdump
```




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sell dumps track2; sell usa dumps; sell dumps track1;

BY: A GUEST ON NOV 3RD, 2014 | SYNTAX: NONE | SIZE: 1.79 KB | VIEWS: 155 | EXPIRES: NEVER

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f 0

0

掌控自己的健康，

快接受乙肝檢查

點擊了解更多



```
1. FRESH & HOT
2. VIRGIN DUMPS;
3. T2; T12; T1+T2.
4.
5. WWW: http://vidu.su
6. ICQ: 622777999
7.
8. Hello.
9. My name is Miranda & i'm seller of dumps, T2 (T1+T2).
10. For a while I was a reseller, but then found a good team, trusted them and now i'm seller.
11. Visit my website now. While he is still working.
```





JUST BUY IT
ICQ: 622777999.



PCI DSS Requirements – Changing the Attacker's Approach

- ▶ Requirement 1: Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data
- ▶ Requirement 2: Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters
- ▶ Requirement 3: Protect stored cardholder data
- ▶ Requirement 4: Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks



PCI DSS Requirements – Changing the Attacker's Approach

- ▶ Requirement 5: Use and regularly update anti-virus software or programs
- ▶ Requirement 6: Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
- ▶ Requirement 7: Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know
- ▶ Requirement 8: Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access



PCI DSS Requirements – Changing the Attacker's Approach

- ▶ Requirement 9: Restrict physical access to cardholder data
- ▶ Requirement 10: Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data
- ▶ Requirement 11: Regularly test security systems and processes
- ▶ Requirement 12: Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel



The Changing Threat Landscape

- ▶ More focused/targeted attacks based on time and effort efficiency
 - Why target thousands of IPs for random scanning if I can get data from one access point?
- ▶ Fraudulent cards are being sold based on a more targeted and geographically based approach
 - Selling by card brand, BIN and even ZIP code
- ▶ Attackers are entering the premises
 - Terminal swaps – grocery, liquor stores
 - ATM physical breach



Standalone Terminals – On-Premise Hacking

- ▶ Rare but growing attack vector
- ▶ Dangerous as it also captures PIN information
- ▶ Attackers often replace the remote/desolate device
- ▶ Prevention – examine machines daily



Service Providers and Breach Trends

August 01, 2014

A wake-up call for retailers

Share this article:



Earlier this month, it was **reported** that Information Systems & Supplies Inc. (IS&S), a food service **point-of-sale** (POS) and security systems provider, notified customers of a remote access breach that may have exposed card data from POS transactions.


In a **letter to customers**, IS&S said a LogMeIn account used by the company to remotely support customers was breached, and they have reason to believe that the data accessed could include credit card information.

The article notes, "IS&S is an independent reseller of POS products sold by software vendor Future POS Inc. Future POS customers named on IS&S's site include restaurant chains such as Dairy Queen and TacoTime."

The POS vendor's president went on to confirm that his company's remote access credentials were compromised, possibly through a phishing attack.

While IS&S should be commended for immediately notifying customers about the potential breach and also taking steps to improve remote access security, this breach is yet another wake-up call for retail and hospitality chains to evaluate their third-party vendors.

The circumstances of this event are similar to the massive **Target data breach** that occurred late last year, in which hackers compromised an HVAC vendors' credentials to initially infiltrate the big box retailer's network.



Boathner Blankenstein, senior director of solutions engineering, Bomgar Corporation



Vendor–Related Risk

- ▶ Vendor remote access
- ▶ Vendor servers on network
 - Often IT does not have control
 - No anti-virus, not patched, weak passwords
- ▶ Vendor on network with BYOD
- ▶ Vendors without incident response details in their contract



LogMeIn – 2014

- ▶ Resellers and integrators are the Achilles heel of POS users
- ▶ 100–1,000 businesses can be breached in a matter of hours
- ▶ Resellers often make quasi-strong passwords
 - Attackers quickly figure these out



Alert (TA14-212A)

Backoff Point-of-Sale Malware

Original release date: July 31, 2014 | Last revised: August 1, 2014

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Systems Affected

Point-of-Sale Systems



LogMeIn – 2014

- ▶ Backoff also has some direct correlation to phishing attacks
- ▶ Attackers are phishing IT people to gain LogMeIn credentials
 - IT people are smart, but often busy
 - IT people often don't apply the same security to their own PCs



Alert (TA14-212A)

Backoff Point-of-Sale Malware

Original release date: July 31, 2014 | Last revised: August 1, 2014

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Systems Affected

Point-of-Sale Systems



Third Party Security Assurance

Main areas of focus:

- ▶ Third-party service provider due diligence
- ▶ Service correlation to PCI DSS requirements
- ▶ Written agreements and policies/procedures
- ▶ Monitoring service provider compliance status



What About Breach Protection?

- ▶ Typically covers up to \$50k or \$100k
 - Forensic investigation
 - Fines and penalties
 - Card replacement costs
 - Some plans cover POS system upgrades
- ▶ Makes the post-breach process better all around
 - For the merchant – Allows things to move faster/easier to work with
 - For the acquirer – Knows they will not be left holding the bag on all the possible costs



What About Cyber Insurance?

- ▶ Cyber insurance typically covers:
 - Forensic investigation (overlap with breach protection)
 - Should include first party and third party activities
 - Crisis management costs – notifications, etc.
 - May include coverage of consumer civil suits relating to identity theft



What Could Have Stopped These Breaches?

- ▶ Securing remote access ('14 & '15 breaches)
 - Must be turned on by a human at the store locations
 - Two-factor authentication
 - Management, not just IT, should get notification when someone is working on the critical systems
- ▶ Firewalls that block outbound connectivity
 - Your board should understand what “whitelisting” means
 - Corporations (and firewall vendors) should not let merchants opt out




What Could Have Stopped These Breaches?

- ▶ Segmentation
 - Corporate networks and guest wireless should be separate from critical systems
 - Site-to-site communication should be forbidden, even for IT functions



Network Scope & Segmentation

- ▶ PCI or otherwise
 - TJX (2006)
 - Target (2013)
- ▶ Reduce your liability
- ▶ This includes infrastructure
 - Patching server in Office A should not reach Office B



What Your Organization Must Change (Right Now)

- ▶ Block outbound connectivity – whitelist, not blacklist for critical infrastructure
- ▶ Segmentation
 - Users (and servers) in Office A should not be able to access Office B
- ▶ Remote access
 - Control it, MONITOR it
 - 11:00 p.m. remote access is no different than an employee in the office at 11:00 p.m.
 - Two-factor authentication, no exceptions



What Your Organization Must Change (Right Now)

- ▶ Service accounts (or any unchanged passwords)
- ▶ Integrate humans into security monitoring
- ▶ Vendors
 - Fix contracts to allow audits and investigations
 - Vendors also include “the cloud”



Looking Forward

If the last 30 minutes did not scare you:

- ▶ Corporate espionage
 - Would your competitors want to know your success methods, your budget?
 - Domestic or foreign
- ▶ Road warrior dangers
- ▶ Tradeshow spying



Questions?

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